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How Does Directors Remuneration Affect SMEs’ Performance? 
 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explain empirically the relationship between the 
remuneration levels of a sample of listed Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) directors and 
firm performance. The paper also investigates whether deviations from the optimal directors’ 
remuneration level reduce firm performance. 
Design/methodology/approach – The study uses a panel data regression analysis of 802 AIM-
listed SMEs over an eight-year period (2005-2012). 
Findings – Using a non-linear approach, the results show that an optimum director’s 
remuneration level exist which results from comparing the benefits and costs of director’s 
remuneration. Hence, the paper does not only show how directors’ remuneration level affects 
firm performance, it also extends the stream of knowledge by indicating how a deviation from 
the optimal point influences UK-listed SMEs performance. Moreover, the results show that 
the effect of directors’ remuneration on firm performance is greater during financial crisis 
period. 
Originality/value – Compared with previous literature on directors’ remuneration, this paper 
focuses on AIM-listed SMEs and our finding of a concave relationship between directors’ 
remuneration level and performance of leads us to recommend that firms, especially SMEs 
should endeavour to determine the optimal level of directors’ remuneration to maximise 
performance. 
Keywords 
Directors’ remuneration; SMEs; AIM; Performance; UK 
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How Does Directors Remuneration Affect SMEs’ Performance? 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This article attempts to explain empirically the relationship between the remuneration levels of 
a sample of listed Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) directors and firm performance over 
the period 2005−2012. A number of previous studies (Murphy, 1985; Main et al., 1996; Wan 
et al., 2000; Stathopoulos et al., 2004; Doucouliagos et al., 2007; Gregg et al., 2012) have 
investigated the relationship between directors’ remuneration and performance (as measured 
by shareholder return). This is because remuneration is widely seen as a means to bridge the 
interest gap between shareholders and directors (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). As argued by 
Jensen and Murphy (1990), directors pay (including cash, options, stockholdings, and 
dismissal) can limit agency problems by aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. 
Doucouliagos et al. (2007) suggest that remuneration can be used to solicit directors’ efforts, 
reward productivity and ensure compliance with shareholders’ interests. Amess and Drake 
(2003) allude that directors’ remuneration is a potentially potent device by which to attenuate 
managerial opportunistic behaviour. However, many recent studies have reignited the debate 
as to whether directors’ remuneration mitigates the agency conflicts in modern corporations 
(Goering, 1996; Murphy, 1997; Grundy and Li, 2010; Van Essen et al., 2012). Zajac and 
Westphal (2004) argue that the theory could become the dominant institutional logic for 
corporate governance. 
 
 There have been many recommendations regarding directors’ remuneration including 
the disclosure of directors’ remuneration and the setting up of remuneration and audit 
committees (Greenbury, 1995). For example, Greenbury (1995) suggests that directors’ 
remuneration should have strict performance criteria. In this paper, we focus on the cash 
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remuneration part of directors’ remuneration package, which includes basic salaries and 
bonuses. This is because the cash remuneration of firms has increased immensely over the past 
decade (Doucouliagos et al., 2007), and our data shows that only a handful of SMEs give non-
cash incentives. For example, research by Gregg et al. (2005) indicates that the cash 
compensation of UK firm directors has been rising by an average of 10% per annum. Therefore, 
understanding the relationship between cash compensation and performance is important and 
germane. There have been many studies that have examined the cash remuneration of firms 
due to the difficulty in obtaining information on incentive-based remuneration (see, Murphy, 
1999). For example, Murphy (1999) drew a distinction between cash remuneration and total 
remuneration. 
 There have been widespread concerns over directors’ remuneration, in particular for 
those firms who are not performing (Scholtz and Smit, 2012). Directors’ remuneration has 
attracted the attention of investors, the media, trade unions, researchers and the general public 
(PWC, 2009). The Economist (2004) highlights that the huge salaries for executives would be 
much less controversial if there were evidence that the executives earned these salaries. Some 
of the high remuneration packages to directors of the underperforming firm include the 
$380,619 in cash and stock paid to Enron directors in 2001 in the United States (The New York 
Times) has posed a question as to whether higher remuneration leads to higher firm 
performance. 
 Whiles lower remuneration package could result in poor performance because it will 
not motivate the directors to work hard in a way which is acceptable to shareholders (Carlos 
and Nicolas, 1996; Scholtz and Smit, 2012), excessive remuneration could lead to poor firm 
performance because well-remunerated directors may be less likely to “rock the boat” (Scholtz 
and Smit, 2012). For example, it is widely believed that the excessive remuneration of Enron’s 
directors may have caused their objectivity to be comprised in monitoring management on 
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behalf of the shareholders. Based on the two contrasting effects of director’s remuneration on 
firm performance, it can, therefore, be argued that an optimal remuneration level may exist at 
which the performance of the firm is maximised. This means that the relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and performance may be concave instead of the linear as previously 
suggested. 
 Examination of the link between directors’ remuneration and performance of SMEs is 
crucial, given that SMEs lack financial resources (Whited, 1992; Fazzari and Peterson, 1993; 
Peterson and Rajan, 1997). Financial resources have been identified as the most significant 
challenge facing SMEs (Abor and Quartey 2010; Lader 1996; Cook and Nixson 2000; Parker 
et al. 1995). Hutchinson and Xavier (2006) suggest that SMEs face more difficulties in raising 
finance than larger ones. According to Abor and Quartey (2010), formal finance institutions 
have tailored their products to best serve the needs of larger corporations.  This means that 
while SMEs should be able to attract capable directors who can make maximum use of the 
limited resources; at the same time, the lack of resources will make any excessive remuneration 
to be detrimental to performance. Watson et al. (1994) believe that existing theories and 
empirical findings of directors’ pay based upon large firms will be of limited relevance to 
understanding the factors influencing the remuneration of directors in SMEs. 
The ability of SMEs to determine the directors’ remuneration level at which 
performance is maximised is beneficial to all economies of the world, given that the majority 
of firms around the world are SMEs (Abor and Quartey, 2010). SMEs are the mainstay of 
economic development in most countries around the world (Beaver and Prince, 2004; Lukacs, 
2005; Newberry, 2006). For example, the Department for Business Innovation and Skills 
(2011) states that the number of SMEs in the UK is 99.8 percent of all the firms, accounting 
for 50.1 percent of turnover. Given the economic contribution that SMEs make, Chittithaworn 
et al. (2011) argue that the performance of the SME sector is closely associated with the 
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performance of a country. This means that any policy implications derived from researching 
the remuneration level at which SMEs performance is maximised have the potential to 
influence the country’s economic growth, which impacts on the welfare of its citizens. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
There are some theories (e.g. agency theory, tournament theory, stewardship theory) that 
explain the influence of directors’ compensation on firm’s performance. Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) argue that one of the distinctive paths followed by researchers seeking evidence of links 
between boards of directors and firm performance is agency theory. Agency theory is of the 
assertion that improved firms’ performance can be achieved by increasing the remuneration of 
directors (Smith and Watts, 1992). Although the agency theory first appeared in the academic 
economic literature in the early 1970s (see Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973), it has 
since been applied in many other fields like accounting (e.g., Demski and Feltham, 1978), 
finance (e.g., Fama, 1980), marketing (e.g., Basu et al., 1985), political science (e.g., Mitnick, 
1986), organisational behaviour (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1985, 1988; Kosnik, 1987), and sociology 
(e.g., Eccles, 1985; White, 1985).  
Miller and Sardais (2011) argue that agency theory is based on the assumption that 
agents tend to be selfish opportunists who, without effective monitoring, will exploit their 
owners. This conflict of interest would arise as a result of the separation of ownership and 
control in the organisation (Berle and Means, 1932; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Proponents of 
the theory argue that the primary function of boards is to protect the interests of shareholder 
(principals) (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Mizruchi, 1983). Hence, the 
compensation package given to directors and managers is explained by the agency theory to 
help align the interests of directors and managers to those of shareholders (Boyd, 1994; Dalton 
et al., 2003; Elson, 1995). The agency theory assumes that companies design directors’ and 
managers’ contracts with an optimal incentive to motivate them to improve performance, 
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thereby maximising shareholder value. It is therefore depicted that higher incentives to 
directors of companies will lead to performance maximisation.  
Stewardship theory has its background in the management control literature (e.g., Davis 
et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Lee and O'Neill, 2003). While agency theory argues 
that separation of incumbency of roles of board chair and CEO lead to the protection of 
shareholder interests, stewardship theory posits that shareholder interests are maximised by 
shared incumbency of these roles (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Stewardship theory suggests 
that some executives are likely to pursue organisational interests even when there is a conflict 
with their self-interest (Donaldson and Davis, 1991), which means that executives are more 
intrinsically motivated than agency theory implies (Wasserman, 2006). 
Under the stewardship theory, the use of compensation packages such as bonuses to 
entice directors and managers in a bid to make them align their interest with that of the 
shareholders is irrelevant. This is because managers are professional people who know what 
they are doing and that there is no need to entice them. Moreover, they have their personal 
ambition to succeed, which should ultimately lead to higher company performance. Managers 
also have fiduciary roles to the shareholders and duty of loyalty, which Bainbridge (2003 p. 
580) argues ‘can be understood as one of those voluntarily self-imposed restrictions on the 
board of director's discretion’. They also see themselves as stewards employed by principals 
and whose interests tend to be aligned with those of the principals (Wasserman, 2006). Davis 
et al. (1997) argue that these stewards are organisationally centered executives who show a 
keen interest in their organisations, and this gives them higher satisfaction from behaviours that 
promote the organisations' interests than from self-serving behaviours.  
Based on the intuitions of the tournament theory, directors of companies must be highly 
compensated to attract the best people on companies’ board, which can bring about 
performance maximisation. Tournament theory has its roots within the labour economics 
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literature more than three decades ago (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). The theory suggests that 
tournament ‘participants are best motivated to perform when prizes are not contingent on 
absolute output but instead are a function of winners and losers’ (Conelly et al. 2013 p. 17). 
Hence, because directors are seen as useful resources, hiring high calibre of directors will 
ensure high-quality resources, which will enhance performance. The ability of a company to 
extract both internal and external resources will depend on the calibre of the board of directors. 
As argued by Daily and Johnson (1997), prestigious directors not only increase companies’ 
legitimacy but also provide links to other prestigious individuals. It is therefore argued under 
the tournament theory that higher compensation will attract high-quality calibre of directors, 
which should increase the performance of companies. 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
The Cadbury Report (1992) and the Greenbury Report (1995) all failed to prescribe how to 
determine the directors’ remuneration. Rather, both reports prescribe that firms should design 
a remuneration package that is capable of attracting and retaining executive directors of good 
calibre. There is a larger literature on directors’ remuneration but the majority have 
concentrated on larger firms rather than SMEs (Main et al. 1996; Ghosh 2003; Gregg et al. 
2005; Brick et al. 2006). Arguments for a positive association are that a good compensation 
package, linked to performance, will entice directors to work hard to increase their 
remuneration, and will attract the highest-calibre directors with the most-needed specialisation 
(Jensen and Murphy 1990). Parthasarathy et al. (2006) argue that directors’ short- and long-
term incentives benefit shareholders by motivating directors to perform better. According to 
Zhou et al (2011), aligning shareholders’ interest with directors’ compensation benefits has 
become one of the main considerations in corporate governance. The supervisory duty of 
directors also plays an important role in monitoring the behaviour of senior managers (Jensen, 
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1993; John and Senbet, 1998) and therefore board members should be remunerated in such a 
way to curb the opportunistic behaviour of senior managers.  
  One of the first influential articles was by Murphy (1986), in which he indicated a 
strong relationship between firm performance and directors’ remuneration using large publicly 
held USA firms. Jensen and Murphy (1990) used a sample of larger US firms to investigate the 
relationship between CEO wealth and shareholder wealth and found little evidence of a 
relationship between CEO remuneration and performance. Main et al. (1996) and Benito and 
Conyon (1999) also investigated a sample of UK firms and found a positive relationship 
between directors’ remuneration and firm performance. In Australia, O’Neil and Iob (1999) 
examined the determinants of remuneration and showed a link between remuneration and 
performance. A positive association between directors’ remuneration and performance was 
reported by Main et al. (1996), Conyon and Peck (1998), Firth et al. (1999), Ozkan (2007a) 
and Hassan et al. (2003). 
  However, high-compensation packages may impair the directors’ judgement, giving 
managers the advantage of being able to pursue their own interests at the expense of 
performance. Also, higher compensation may lead to the practice of ‘mutual back scratching’ 
by directors who collectively propose better packages for each other at the expense of 
performance (Brick et al. 2006). In this sense, directors may collectively propose higher 
compensation packages for each other so as to keep all directors happy, but at the expense of 
company performance. Research by Bricks et al. (2006) found a highly positive association 
between other directors and CEO remunerations and therefore suggested the presence of 
mutual back scratching. Even though the general purpose of the board of directors is to advise 
and monitor top management, Jensen (1993) suggests that the directors often fail to effectively 
monitor the firms’ top management. Well-compensated directors may be less likely to “rock 
the boat”; meaning excess directors compensation may be associated with a culture that does 
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not allow for constructive criticism (Brick et al., 2006). Jensen (1993, p. 863) referred to this 
as “the great emphasis on politeness and courtesy at the expense of truth and frankness in 
boardrooms.”  
  The effect of higher directors’ compensation on company performance is evident in a 
study by Hassan et al (2003). This study found that even though the level of directors’ 
remuneration showed a steady growth between 1997 and 1998, there was a deteriorating of 
performance for the same period measured by ROE. Abdullah (2006) and Ozkan (2007) also 
documented a negative relationship.  
 This study estimates the optimal directors’ remuneration as the equilibrium between the 
costs and benefits of lower or higher directors’ remuneration. Thus, this study investigates two 
different effects of directors’ remuneration on firm performance. Therefore, at lower levels of 
directors’ remuneration, an increase in directors’ remuneration level is the sign to increases in 
firm performance. On the other hand, at higher levels of directors’ remuneration, an increase 
in directors’ remuneration is the indication of a reduction in firm performance. Thus, a 
nonlinear (concave) association is likely to exist between directors’ remuneration level and 
firm performance (see Figure in Appendix 1).  
 Based on the existing empirical evidence on the relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and firm performance, the following hypotheses are tested by this study: 
  H1 there is a concave relationship between directors’ remuneration and firm    
performance  
 H2 deviation from the optimal directors’ remuneration level reduces firm performance 
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4. SAMPLE, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Sample selection and data 
The target population of this study was all the firms listed on the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM). As at 7th of April 2014, 1,126 firms were listed on the AIM. Financial firms (such as 
banks and insurance companies) were excluded because they have different accounting 
requirements and asset structure (see Afrifa and Taurigana, 2015); this left 1,014 firms 
available for selection. The decision to exclude all financial institutions is consistent with 
Mangena and Tauringana (2007) and Ntim (2009). Moreover, firm-years with anomalies in 
their accounts such as negative values in assets, sales, current assets, fixed assets were omitted 
(see, Abor and Quartey, 2010). Also, firms missing substantial amount of information were 
excluded. The final sample of SMEs, which is based on the requirements established by the 
European Commission’s Recommendation 2003/361/CE of 6th May 2003, on the definition of 
SMEs, therefore consists of an unbalanced panel of 802 firms for which information is 
available. It represents 5,614 firm-year observations. Specifically, the following criteria are 
used for the selection of SMEs12: 
 Turnover less than €50 million; and 
 Possession of less than €43 million of total assets. 
 
                                                 
1 The average exchange rate per each year from 2005-2012 was used to convert the total assets and turnover 
values from British Pounds Sterling to Euro. 
2 Although the European Commission’s Recommendation 2003/361/CE of 6th May 2003 uses the number 
of employees as a third criteria, we purposefully exclude this third criteria because firms in our sample 
have data regarding number of employees. Afrifa (2016) also excluded the number of employees in their 
definition of SMEs in accordance with the European Commission’s Recommendation 2003/361/CE of 6th 
May 2003. 
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We use firm-year observations rather than firms, which allows for both entry and exit, 
and helps to reduce possible selection and survivor bias. The financial and accounting data 
used in this study were obtained from Analyse Major Databases from European Sources 
(AMADEUS). This database contains both annual accounts and management details of about 
330,000 public and private companies in 41 European countries, including the UK. The 
reliability of AMADEUS data is evident from its extensive use by other researchers (see, 
Ahmed, 2015; Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2015). The sample was collected from the AIM because 
it is one of the few stock exchanges around the world established specifically for SMEs 
(Mendoza, 2007), and is by far the most successful second-tier market (Colombelli, 2010).  
 
4.2 Variables  
The dependent variable to be analysed is Tobin’s ratio (QRATIO) defined as the ratio of the 
firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its assets (Martinez-Sola et al., 2013). QRATIO 
has been used extensively in the accounting and finance literature to measure firm performance 
(Lin and Su, 2008; Tong, 2008). Following Martinez-Sola et al. (2013), we also include two 
additional proxies including Market-To-Book ratio 1 (MKBK1) and Market-to-Book ratio 2 
(MKBK2) as firm performance to test the robustness of the results.  MKBK1 is defined as the 
ratio of market value of firm (market value of equity plus book value of total debt) to book 
value of firm (total assets) – as suggested by Chung and Pruitt (1994). MKBK2 is defined as 
ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity (Martinez-Sola et al., 2013). The key 
independent variable is directors’ remuneration, defined as the natural log of the total 
remuneration of all directors (including chief executive officers) for each financial year. 
Directors’ remuneration and its square, directors’ remuneration2 serve to test for the existence 
of a nonlinear model. 
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The following control variables are included in all regressions because they have been 
found by previous literature to explain firm performance (see, Main et al. (1996), Benito and 
Conyon (1999), Conyon and Peck (1998), Firth et al. (1999), Ozkan (2007a) and Hassan et al. 
(2003), Scholtz and Smit (2012)). These include company age, company size, asset tangibility, 
financial leverage ratio, liquidity ratio and short-term financing. All variables are defined in 
Table 1 below. 
[Table 1 about here] 
4.3 Methodology 
Preliminary data analysis was employed to test for the presence of outliers in the sample. 
Outliers can be dealt with in two major ways including winsorisation or data removal (Beiner, 
et al., 2006). In this paper, the decision was made to winsorise all variables at the 1% (see, 
Hellerstein, 2008). The decision to winsorise all variables are in line with similar procedures 
by previous researchers in accounting and finance literature (see, Kieschnick et al., 2006; Hill 
et al., 2010). Also, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation were carried out. The Breusch-
Pagan and Breusch-Godfrey tests and the Woodridge test for autocorrelation were used to test 
for – and suggested the presence of – heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Therefore, a 
decision was made to employ robust standard error (Lei, 2006) in estimating all models.  
Since panel data regression is used, the Hausman’s test is utilised to decide whether to 
employ the Fixed Effects (FE) model or Random Effect (RE) model by first determining 
whether there is a correlation between the unobservable heterogeneity (𝜇𝑖) of each firm and 
the explanatory variables of the model. The Hausman test was performed, which rejected the 
null hypothesis that the unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the regressors. This 
finding means that the RE is significantly different from the FE, and therefore the FE is more 
consistent and efficient method to use. The estimates of the models are as follows: 
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We define all variables in Table 1 above. FP is the firm performance (QRATIO, 
MKBK1 and MKBK2) and the independent variable is directors’ remuneration, which 
measures directors’ remuneration by firm i at time t. The subscript i denotes the nth firm (i = 
1,... 802) and the subscript t denotes the nth year (t=1,...8). µi is the unobservable heterogeneity 
(individual effects), which is specific for each firm, and εit is the error term. These four models 
will assist in achieving the objective of this paper. First, equation (1) will determine whether a 
concave relationship exists between directors’ remuneration and firm performance. The second 
and third equations will indicate whether a deviation from the optimal directors’ remuneration 
point affect performance. Lastly, the fourth equation will establish the effect of above and 
below deviations from the optimal directors’ remuneration level relationship with firm 
performance. 
 
4.4 Endogeneity test 
Many researchers have stated endogeneity as a major issue in the corporate governance 
literature (Heckman, 1979; Denis, 2001; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Bellemare et al., 
2015). In the presence of endogeneity, the random effects parameter estimates may be 
biased. One way to overcome endogeneity problems is the use of GMM estimation model; 
however, in the absence of endogeneity issues the random effects will produce parameter 
estimates that are more efficient. Potential endogeneity problems arising from omitted 
explanatory variables, simultaneity bias and measurement errors could blight the results 
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of this paper (Roberts and Whited, 2013; El Ghoul and Zheng, 2016). In this paper, 
omitted variables may arise if potential control variables are omitted due to data 
unavailability (Wooldridge, 2002). Further, simultaneity bias may arise if firm 
performance and directors’ remuneration are determined in equilibrium. That is, 
performance influencing directors’ remuneration Finally, measurement error 
endogeneity occurs if the main independent variable is incorrectly measured (Larcker 
and Rusticus, 2010). 
 To test for the presence of endogeneity, we rely on the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
(DHW) test for endogeneity (Durbin, 1954; Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978) and include block 
ownership, executive directors’ ownership, foreign ownership, non-executive directors 
and board size as instrumental variables The DHW test has been used extensively in the 
corporate governance literature to test for the presence of endogeneity (see, Hutchinson 
et al., 2015; Ntim, 2016; Ahmed et al., 2017; Pillai et al., 2017). The results are presented 
in Table 4 for all three measures of firm performance. The p-values for all the DHW tests 
are insignificant, which show that endogeneity is not a significant concern. These findings 
confirm that the random effects coefficient estimates are reliable and unbiased.  
 
5.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 offers descriptive statistics of the continuous variables employed in this paper. The 
QRATIO has a mean of 1.4923 and a median of 1.5868. The MKBK1 has a mean of 1.7923 
and a median of 1.4868. MKBK2 is on average 2.8923 with a median of 1.1868. The 
differences in the three performance measures above indicate the existence of differences 
among firm measures of firm performance. The means of the variables MKBK1 and MKBK2 
are above the median values, indicating a strong scattering towards the right tail. This means 
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that some companies’ values are much higher than the others. On the other hand, the variable 
QRATIO has a mean, which is lower than the median value. Directors’ remuneration has a 
mean of approximately £309,483 and a median of £74,031. The average age of the company 
used in the study is 14.4 years and the median is 9.6 years. Company size has a mean of 
£4,615,949 and the median is £2,517,000. The mean for asset tangibility is 38.73% and its 
median is 37.50%. the mean and median for the financial leverage of companies used in the 
study are 16.255 and 0.03%, respectively. Short-term financing has a mean of 54.89% and a 
median of 30%. The mean liquidity for the AIM firms selected is 2.4545 with a median of 1.36. 
[Table 2 about here] 
5.2 Correlation matrix 
The results of the Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in Table 3 for all continuous 
variables included in the study and indicate a significant and negative correlation between 
directors’ remuneration and QRATIO, MKBK1, and MKBK2 at the 1 per cent level. They also 
indicate a significant and positive correlation between directors’ remuneration and both 
company age and size at the 1 per cent level. The correlations between the independent 
variables are also significant. The correlation between MKBK1 and company size is 0.088, 
significant at the 5 percent level. MKBK2 and asset tangibility have a negative correlation 
while MKBK2 and liquidity have a positive correlation and both significant at the 5 percent 
level. Asset tangibility and directors’ remuneration also have a correlation coefficient of 0.020, 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
 [Table 3 about here] 
 
5.3 Directors’ remuneration and firm performance 
In order to determine whether an optimum level of directors’ remuneration exists we estimate 
equation (1), where the firm performance in i at time t depends on directors’ remuneration and 
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its square (directors’ remuneration2). The two variables are included to test for the optimal 
breakpoint of the firm performance-directors’ remuneration relationship. To confirm the 
hypothesis stated above, β1 and β2 must be positive and negative, respectively. As specified 
above, the study also includes six control variables.  
Table 4 shows the results from estimating equation (1) using three different proxies for 
firm performance. In the first column, the calculation of firm performance is QRATIO. In the 
second and third columns, MKBK1 and MKBK2 are proxies for firm performance, 
respectively. Consistent with expectation, directors’ remuneration is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% or less level for the three proxies of firm performance, while directors’ 
remuneration2 is negative and significant at the 1% level for the three measures of firm 
performance. This means that directors’ remuneration increases firm performance up to the 
breakpoint, after which, increases in the directors’ remuneration reduces the firm performance. 
The consistency of the results for all three dependent variables demonstrates the robustness of 
the findings in relation to the nonlinear relationship between directors’ remuneration and firm 
performance. For the control variables, company age, company size and asset tangibility relate 
positively to the three proxies of firm performance. The coefficient of leverage is positive but 
not significant. Liquidity and short-term financing are significant and negatively related to the 
three proxies of firm performance.  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
5.4 Deviation from the optimal directors’ remuneration level 
A concave relationship exists between directors’ remuneration and firm performance because 
of the two contrary effects of directors’ remuneration and directors’ remuneration2 on firm 
performance. Therefore, this section provides evidence to support the motion that firm 
performance declines if a firm moves away from the optimum directors’ remuneration point. 
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Thus, the study analyses the relation between deviations from optimal directors’ remuneration 
and firm performance. Since a nonlinear directors’ remuneration-performance relationship 
exists, means that there is an optimal point which maximises firm performance, and that 
deviations from this optimal directors’ remuneration level may reduce firm performance. To 
determine the effect of a deviation from the optimal directors’ remuneration level, in equation 
(1) we eliminate variable directors’ remuneration and directors’ remuneration2 and include the 
residual estimated in the benchmark specification for the determinants of directors’ 
remuneration as explanatory variable, which is similar to that performed by Martinez-Sola et 
al. (2013).  
 In order to do this, the study considers equation 2 above as the benchmark specification 
for the determinants of directors’ remuneration. The result from estimating equation (2) is 
contained in Appendix 2. Now, the residuals from equation (2) are obtained and included in 
equation (1) after eliminating directors’ remuneration and directors’ remuneration2. Therefore, 
DEVIATION is the absolute value for the residuals. The aim is to determine if deviations from 
the optimal directors’ remuneration level affect firms’ performance, using estimation of 
equation (3). DEVIATION is the main independent variable in this model, defined as the 
absolute value of residuals of Equation (2). It is expected that β1 < 0 in equation (3), to imply a 
negative relationship between deviations from optimal directors’ remuneration and firm 
performance.    
 Table 5 contains panel data regression to explain whether deviations from optimum 
directors’ remuneration affect firm performance (equation 3). As expected, the coefficient of 
DEVIATION is negative and significant at the 5% level or less in all three columns. This 
demonstrates an inverse relationship between DEVIATION and firm performance. This 
outcome confirms the existence of a point at which directors’ remuneration maximise firm 
performance and that as firms move away from this point their performance is affected. Once 
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again, all three alternative measures of firm performance: QRATIO, MKBK1 and MKBK2 
show the robustness of the results. However, equation (3) does not determine whether these 
deviations are positive or negative. 
[Table 5 about here] 
We now include an interactive term in equation (4) to analyse the way in which both 
above and below deviations from the optimal directors’ remuneration level affect the firm 
performance. We define the variable INTERACT as above-optimal * DEVIATION. The 
above-optimal is a dummy variable that takes 1 for positive residuals and 0 otherwise. 
Therefore, we use estimation equation (4) above.
 
DEVIATION is the main independent 
variable to be analysed as displayed in Table 6. The main objective is to determine how 
DEVIATION (coefficient β1) and DEVIATION + INTERACT (coefficient β1 + β2) affect firm 
performance. Hence, the expectation is β1 < 0 and β1 + β2 <0. The results from Table 6 imply a 
negative effect of both above-optimal and below-optimal deviations on firm performance. If 
the residuals are positive, above-optimal variable takes the value 1, and β1 + β2 account for 
effect on firm performance. Otherwise, if residuals are negative, above-optimal variable takes 
the value 0, which means that INTERACT is 0 and β1 account for effect. 
According to Table 6, DEVIATION is negative and statistically significant under all 
three measures of firm performance. Also, INTERACT is negatively related to firm 
performance in all three columns. Here, the interest is the sum of the coefficients β1 + β2. For 
example, in Column 1 the figures for β1 + β2 are (–0.944 + (–0.536) = –1.480). These results 
support H2, which deviation on either side of the optimal directors’ remuneration reduces firm 
performance. The results are strongly consistent using all three alternative measures of firm 
performance, and hence a quadratic relationship between directors’ remuneration and firm 
performance is confirmed. Moreover, the findings indicate that any deviations from the optimal 
directors’ remuneration, either above or below significantly reduce firm performance. 
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[Table 6 about here] 
5.5 Directors’ remuneration and SMEs performance during financial crisis  
The recent financial crisis has renewed the debate about directors’ remuneration (Chen 
et al., 2011). In this section, we examine whether the relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and SMEs performance persisted during the financial crisis of 2007 and 
2008. To do this, we create a dummy variable crisis which is equal to one for the period 
from 2007 to 2008 and zero otherwise. The results presented in Table 7 show that the 
concave relationship between director remuneration and SMEs performance existed 
during the financial crisis. However, the coefficients of the interaction variables 
(DREM*crisis) and DREM2 * crisis) are greater than the coefficients of the variables 
DREM and DREM2  in. These indicate that the effect of directors’ remuneration on SMEs 
performance is more severe during financial crisis period than normal period. The results 
show that directors must be motivated to higher performance during financial crisis 
period and that a lower remuneration will sharply affect performance, given the general 
decline in firm performance during financial crisis (Aktas et al. (2015). 
 
CONCLUSION 
The objective of the study was to investigate the relationship between directors’ remuneration 
and firm performance. The study was based on a panel data regression analysis of 802 SMEs 
over an eight-year period (2005-2012). First, the study empirically tests for the existence of an 
optimal directors’ remuneration level at which firms’ performance is maximised. Second, the 
paper examines whether deviations from the optimal directors’ remuneration level reduce firm 
performance. The existing research that has investigated the relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and firm profitability has mostly assumed a linear association. Using a non-linear 
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approach, the results show that an optimum director’s remuneration level exist which results 
from comparing the benefits and costs of director’s remuneration.  
The results confirm the existence of directors’ remuneration level, which maximises 
firm performance. Deviations from the optimal level reduce firm performance; hence, the 
establishment of an appropriate remuneration package for directors is of paramount importance 
to firms. This paper has contributed to knowledge on how directors’ remuneration level affects 
firm performance. While researchers highlight the impact of directors’ remuneration on firm 
performance, this study extends the stream of knowledge by indicating how a deviation from 
the optimal point influences UK-listed SMEs performance. Moreover, compared with previous 
literature on directors’ remuneration, this paper focuses on AIM-listed SMEs on the London 
Stock Exchange.  
In terms of managerial implications, our finding of a concave relationship between 
directors’ remuneration level and the performance of UK-listed SMEs leads us to recommend 
that firms, especially SMEs should endeavour to determine the optimal level of directors’ 
remuneration to maximise performance. One plausible way that SMEs may be able to 
determine optimal directors’ remuneration is to match their remuneration package with 
those of industry peers that are performing well.  The main limitation of this study is that 
the above findings are limited to 802 non-financial AIM-listed SMEs that met our criteria. 
Nevertheless, given that all SMEs that met our criteria were examined over an eight-year 
period, the results are representative of the test of the relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and performance.        
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Appendix 1 
Figure 1: Concave association between directors’ remuneration level and firm performance 
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Appendix 2 
Antecedents of Directors Remuneration 
Variables DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION 
BSIZE 0.326(2.87)*** 
CEOTEN 0.015(3.01)*** 
NEDS −0.002(2.82)*** 
COSIZE 0.157(2.96)*** 
INDUST Included 
Number 4,660 
Adjusted R2 38.913 
Constant 9.681(0.234)*** 
Notes:  Coefficients are in front of parentheses. ***Significant at 
0.01 level. t−statistics are in parentheses. The dependent variable is 
directors’ remuneration.  
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Table 1: Summary of Variables Calculations and definitions 
Variables Acronym Measurement 
Tobin’s Q ratio QRATIO The ratio of the firm’s market value to the 
replacement cost of its assets 
Market-To-Book ratio 1 MKBK1 The ratio of market value of firm (market value of 
equity plus book value of total debt) to book value of 
firm (total assets) 
Market-to-Book ratio 2 MKBK2 The ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity 
Remuneration of directors DIRECTORS’ 
REMUNERATION 
Natural log of the total remuneration of directors for 
each financial year 
Square of Remuneration of 
directors 
DIRECTORS’ 
REMUNERATION2 
Remuneration of directors multiplied by 
Remuneration of directors 
Company age COAGE Number of years between incorporation and the 
calendar year end of each firm 
Company size COSIZE The natural log of firm’s turnover at the end of the 
financial year 
Financial Leverage LEV Ratio of total debt divided by capital at the end of the 
financial year 
Assets tangibility ATAN The ratio of fixed assets divided by total assets at the 
end of the financial year 
Liquidity Ratio LIQ Current assets divided by current liabilities at the end 
of the financial year 
Short−term financing SFIN Current liabilities divided by total assets at the end of 
the financial year 
Industry dummy INDUST A dummy variable for each of the six industries: 
construction and mining, software and 
communications, food and pharmaceuticals, support 
services, household and personal goods and 
electronic and electrical equipment 
Non-executive directors NEDS Number of years the CEO has been in post at the 
end of each financial year 
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Board size BSIZE Total number of all directors on the board at the 
end of the financial year 
CEO tenure CEOTEN Number of years the CEO has been in post at the 
end of each financial year 
Deviation DEVIATION DEVIATION is measured as the absolute value 
for the residuals after running regressions where 
the dependent variable is directors remuneration. 
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Table 2: Summary Descriptive Statistics of all Continuous Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Perc 10 Perc 90 
QRATIO 5,614 1.4923 1.3496 1.5868 0.5756 7.3636 
MKBK1 5,614 1.7923 3.3846 1.4868 0.5243 6.2636 
MKBK2 5,614 2.8923 8.2053 1.1868 0.8243 5.9636 
DREM 5,614 309, 482.53 335,982.531 74,031.254 11,621.576 687,737.778 
COAGE 5,614 14.4103 15.0944 9.6383 2.8191 28.1233 
COSIZE 5,614 4615.949 5842.694 2517.00 344.50 13500 
ATAN 5,128 0.3873 .2780442 0.3750 0.0100 0.7900 
LEV 4,882 16.2554 35.81185 0.0300 0.0000 56.0500 
LIQ 4,726 2.454583 3.192115 1.3600 0.1300 6.6800 
SFIN 4,758 .5489097 0.756336 0.3000 0.0400 0.9100 
Notes:   Variables are defined in Table 1. 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix 
 QRATIO MKBK1 MKBK2 DREM COAGE COSIZE ATAN LEV LIQ SFIN 
QRATIO 1.000          
MKBK1 0.553*** 1.000         
MKBK2 0.445*** 0.684*** 1.000        
DREM −0.036*** −0.007*** −0.030*** 1.000       
COAGE 0.171*** 0.160*** 0.103*** 0.043*** 1.000      
COSIZE 0.148*** 0.088** −0.014*** 0.336*** 0.181*** 1.000     
ATAN −0.036** −0.013** −0.009** 0.020** −0.070** 0.109*** 1.000    
LEV 0.008 −0.273 −0.201 0.058* 0.074** 0.239*** 0.180*** 1.000   
LIQ −0.146*** −0.032 0.068** −0.028 −0.053* −0.206*** −0.238*** −0.232*** 1.0000  
SFIN 0.015 −0.004 −0.097*** 0.022 0.084*** 0.252*** −0.002 0.113*** −0.468*** 1.000 
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Table 4: Directors’ Remuneration and Firm Performance 
VARIABLES QRATIO MKBK1 MKBK2 
DREM 1.587(2.07)** 3.742(2.75)** 2.683(3.99)*** 
DREM2 −0.196(−4.50)*** −0.371(−2.86)*** −0.233(−3.28)*** 
COAGE 0.228(8.64)*** 0.609(5.64)*** 0.405(4.41)*** 
COSIZE 1.226(2.95)*** 3.615(6.26)*** 0.672(1.82)* 
ATAN 7.616(2.54)** 3.310(2.59)** 5.761(1.86)* 
LEV −0.033(−0.31) −0.538(−0.39) −0.270(−0.93) 
LIQ −1.732(−3.57)*** −2.192(−3.14)*** 0.146(2.67)** 
SFIN −7.768(−3.68)*** −8.906(−3.64)*** −12.112(−4.16)*** 
Adjusted R2 31.040 31.066 38.406 
Hausman test 0.000 0.000 0.00 
DWH Test Statistic 2.18636 1.64723 1.54343 
P−Value 0.1129 0.1931 0.2230 
Number 4,660 4,660 4,660 
Constant −5.805(−5.06)*** −29.731(−5.27)*** −17.475(−5.43)*** 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parentheses. ***Significant at 0.01 level; **Significant 
at 0.05 level; *Significant at 0.10 level, t−statistics are in parentheses.   
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Table 5: Deviation from the optimal Directors’ Remuneration and Firm Performance (I) 
VARIABLES QRATIO MKBK1 MKBK2 
Deviation −1.025(−3.04)*** −1.237(−10.44)*** −0.174(−2.19)** 
COAGE 0.235(8.41)*** 0.620(5.50)*** 0.411(4.27)*** 
COSIZE 0.833(2.20)** 3.019(7.99)*** 0.357(2.67)** 
ATAN 7.117(−2.33)** 4.242(3.73)*** 6.389(3.28)*** 
LEV −0.032(−1.23) −0.537(−1.18) −0.269(−1.06) 
LIQ −1.691(−3.45)*** −2.119(−2.95)*** 0.191(0.80) 
SFIN −7.124(−3.29)*** −7.880(−3.10)*** −11.529(−4.34)*** 
Adjusted R2 31.01 24.58 31.08 
Number 4,660 4,660 4,660 
Constant −14.065(−5.60)*** −37.256(−8.00)*** −18.559(−4.09)*** 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parentheses. ***Significant at 0.01 level; **Significant 
at 0.05 level, t−statistics are in parentheses.   
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Table 6: Deviation from the optimal Directors’ Remuneration and Firm Performance (II) 
VARIABLES QRATIO MKBK1 MKBK2 
Deviation  −0.944(−2.08)** −1.550(−2.12)** −0.886(−2.76)** 
Interact −0.536(−2.37)** −2.063(3.56)*** −4.697(2.09)** 
COAGE 0.235(8.13)*** 0.618(5.39)*** 0.406(4.19)*** 
COSIZE 0.793(5.77)*** 3.172(5.51)*** 0.705(4.21)*** 
ATAN 7.161(−2.34)** 4.411(−10.51)*** 6.773(8.98)*** 
LEV −0.032(−1.26) −0.536(0.79) −0.267(−1.28) 
LIQ −1.688(−3.40)*** −2.130(−2.98)*** 0.168(0.69) 
SFIN −7.110(−3.26)*** −7.936(−3.10)*** −11.656(−4.25)*** 
Adjusted R2 31.34 31.27 24.73 
Number 4,660 4,660 4,660 
Constant −13.648(−6.22)*** −38.857(−8.52)*** −22.201(−4.80)*** 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parentheses. ***Significant at 0.01 level; 
**Significant at 0.05 level, t−statistics are in parentheses.   
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Table 7: Directors’ remuneration and Firm Performance during financial crisis 
VARIABLES QRATIO MKBK1 MKBK2 
DREM 0.168(2.22)** 
 
0.178(2.31)** 
 
1.831(2.39)** 
DREM2 −0.117(−1.78)* −0.176(−2.24)** −0.192(−2.67)** 
 
DREM*crisis 3.405(2.26)** 8.926(2.48)** 4.202(2.36)** 
 
DREM2 *crisis −0.203(−2.09)** −0.501(−2.89)*** 
 
−0.372(−2.32)** 
COAGE 0.2283(8.76)*** 
 
0.607(5.68)*** 
 
0.405(4.44)*** 
COSIZE 1.231(3.04)*** 
 
3.634(6.29)*** 
 
2.672(4.03)*** 
ATAN 7.303(2.39)** 
 
6.166(2.18)** 
 
6.271(2.25)** 
LEV −0.233(−8.35)*** 
 
−0.540(−10.29)*** 
 
−0.271(−8.68)*** 
LIQ −1.718(−3.64)*** 
 
−2.170(−3.15)*** 
 
−1.152(−2.89)*** 
SFIN −7.665(−3.76)*** 
 
−8.630(−3.37)*** 
 
−12.078(−3.96)*** 
Crisis  −13.4768(−2.75)*** −15.781(−3.24)*** −18.016(−3.37)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.3111 0.3087 0.2429 
 
Number 4,660 4,660 4,660 
 
Constant −10.291(4.09)*** −13.558( −4.37)*** −9.347(−4.19)*** 
 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parentheses. ***Significant at 0.01 level; 
**Significant at 0.05 level, t−statistics are in parentheses.   
 
